Section 3: Business and Commerce by Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview Conferences, Events, and Lectures
1999
Section 3: Business and Commerce
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at The College of William & Mary School of Law
Copyright c 1999 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview
Repository Citation
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at The College of William & Mary School of Law, "Section 3: Business and Commerce" (1999). Supreme
Court Preview. Paper 105.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/105
BUSINESS AND COMMERCE
In This Section:
LAST TERM: Kumho Tire Company, LTD. v. Patrick Carmichael, No. 97-1709
Ruling Extends Judges' Right to Bar Nonscientific Testimony
Richard Carelli ......................................................... 75
Trial judges Told to Screen Experts; Supreme Court Grants Leeway to Exclude
Dubious, Irrelevant Testimony
Joan Biskupic .......................................................... 77
LAST TERM: Esteban Ortif, et al. v. Fibreboard Corporation, et al., No. 97-1704
High Court Overturns Asbestos Settlement;
Ruling Limits Firms' Options in Class Actions
Sharon Walsh .......................................................... 79
The Supreme Court. Liability Law; Justices Throw Out $1.5 Billion Asbestos
Settlement, Citing Possible Conflict of Interest
Stephen Labaton ....................................................... 82
LAST TERM: AT & T Corporation v. Iowa Utilities Board, et al., No. 97-826
High Court Says FCC to Set Telephone Rules; Iowa Utilities Regulators Had Said
They Should Decide How Rates Are Set When Local Firms Lease Networks
Kevin O'Donoghue ..................................................... 85
Divided Court Says FCC Can Set Rules For Local Phone Competition
Richard Carelli ......................................................... 87
NEW CASE: Food & Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corporation, No. 98-1152
NARRATIVE SUMNALRY, Does the FDA have the Authorit to Regulate Tobacco
Matthew Frey .......................................................... 89
Synopsis and Question Presented .......................................... 91
Food & Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corporation, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir.) .............................. ...... 92
Court to Decide F.DA. Power on Tobacco
Linda Greenhouse ..................................................... 104
73
Hgh Court Will Hear Nicotine Ar~guments; The Federal Government Wants Court
To Decide Whether the FDA has Jurisdiction Over Tobacco
James Rosen ...................................................... 107
Justices to Decide FDA's Tobacco Authority
Joan Biskupic ..................................................... 109
FDA Asks Supreme Court to Review Opinion Invalidating Tobacco Regs
TOBACCO INDUSTRY LITIGATION REPORTER ......................................... 112
States Settle With Big Tobacco
THE WASHINGTON POST ............... . .......................... 115
Also This Term ........................................................ 117
74
Last Tenn:
KUMHO Tire Company, LTD., et al., petitioners,
V.
Patrick CARMICHAEL, etc., et al.
No. 97-1709
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided March 23, 1999
RULING EXTENDS JUDGES' RIGHT TO BAR NONSCIENTIFIC
TESTIMONY
The Des Moines Register
Wednesday, March 24, 1999
Richard Carelli, Associated Press
Washington, D.C. The Supreme
Court gave American businesses more
ammunition to fend off product-liability
lawsuits Tuesday by extending the reach
of guidelines that let trial judges exclude
"junk science" as evidence.
Those guidelines, fashioned in a 1993
decision, also apply to the planned
testimony of all expert witnesses, the
court said. Insurers predicted the decision
could play a huge role in anticipated
lawsuits over Year 2000 computer
problems.
The unanimous decision, written by
Justice Stephen Breyer, ended a family's
lawsuit against a tire manufacturer over a
1993 Alabama traffic accident that killed
one person and injured seven others.
Separately, the justices voted 8-1 in
ruling that a federal trial judge correctly
barred an engineer from giving testimony
that linked the accident to a tire defect.
Breyer said the judge rightly doubted
whether the engineer's methodology could
reliably explain why the tire failed.
Tuesday's ruling "enhances judicial
power" at the expense of letting juries
assess evidence, said Gerson Smoger, a
Dallas attorney with Trial Lawyers for
Public Justice.
But Craig Berrington, general counsel
of the American Insurance Association,
called the decision a victory "for honest
trials and honest decisions." He noted that
in many disputes over Y2K computer
problems -in which machines may
misconstrue the year 2000 as 1900 and
malfunction -"the expert testimony of
software engineers or computer science
experts will be essential" to claims of
alleged design defects.
The nation's highest court in 1993
told judges deciding on the admissibility
of expert evidence to consider whether
the theory or technique had been tested,
whether it had been reviewed by others,
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what its possible rate of error might be
and whether it was generally accepted by
scientists.
The guidelines apply directly to federal
courts only, but most state courts model
their rules after their federal counterparts.
In the Alabama case, the 11th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled that
the 1993 guidelines do not apply to
nonscientific testimony. Its ruling gave the
Patrick Carmichael family another chance
to show that engineer David Carlson's
testimony should have been allowed in
their lawsuit against the Kumho Tire Co.
But in Tuesday's ruling, Breyer said
the trial court judge had acted within his
discretion in barring the testimony.
Copyright C 1999 The Des Moines
Register, Inc.
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TRIAL JUDGES TOLD TO SCREEN EXPERTS
Supreme Court Grants New Leeway to Exclude Dubious, Irrelevant
Testimony
The Washington Post
Wednesday, March 24, 1999
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Supreme Court yesterday
enhanced the power of judges to screen
out what they consider dubious expert
testimony in medical malpractice,
defective product and other personal
injury disputes.
By a unanimous vote in a case that
addresses the so-called battle of the
experts, the court ruled that trial judges
must ensure that testimony from all
experts is relevant and reliable before it
reaches a jury. The ruling expands the
breadth of a 1993 decision that set rules
for "scientific" evidence. The court now
requires that any expert witness, scientific
or otherwise, be scrutinized before
testifying.
Writing for the court, Justice Stephen
G. Breyer said judges should "make
certain that an expert, whether basing
testimony upon professional studies or
personal experience, employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual
rigor" required in the expert's "relevant
field." He added, however, that judges
have great leeway in determining whether
an expert's methods and conclusion are
sound.
In a pithy concurrence, Justice
Antonin Scalia observed that the point of
the judge's discretion is to exclude
"expertise that is fausse and science that is
junky."
The widespread use of expert
witnesses in civil cases has prompted
numerous complaints about "junk
science," dueling experts and the
manipulation of jurors. Frequently a
judge's decision on whether to allow a
case to proceed or a jury's verdict can turn
on whether or not an expert witness was
convincing. Underscoring the high stakes
for businesses and the people who sue
them, dozens of manufacturers, insurance
groups, engineers, scientists, trial lawyers
and academics submitted "friend-of-the-
court" briefs.
The Supreme Court's ruling endorsed
a trial judge's decision to block testimony
from a tire expert employing questionable
methodology who claimed that a
manufacturing defect caused a fatal 1993
blowout on an Alabama highway. After
the right rear tire of the minivan driven by
Patrick Carmichael blew out, the vehicle
flipped over, killing one person and
injuring seven others in the Carmichael
family.
Breyer agreed that the trial judge was
right to doubt that an engineer hired by
the Carmichaels could reliably claim that a
manufacturing defect in the tire, which
was more than five years old and
inadequately repaired, caused the blowout.
That testimony was crucial to the
Carmichael family's case and after the
judge excluded it, the judge summarily
ruled for the manufacturer, Kumho Tire
Co.
The 11th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals reinstated the Carmichaels' case,
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saying that the tire testimony was not
covered by the guidelines dealing with
scientific testimony and thus should have
been presented to a jury.
Yesterday's high court reversal, while
favoring Kumho Tire over the
Carmichaels, nonetheless offered
something for advocates on both sides of
the broader debate.
Lawyers for manufacturers praised the
expanded "gatekeeper" role for judges as
a significant step toward ensuring that
jurors do not hear, and subsequently rely
on, untrustworthy expert testimony.
Robert P. Charrow, representing a
group of manufacturers and others
favoring limits on lawsuits, said the court's
guidelines would exclude methods that are
not tried and true, as well as questionable
conclusions. "Basically what the Supreme
Court has been trying to do is prevent
experts from testifying that the Earth is
flat or that we can predict the future using
astrology," he said.
On the other hand, trial lawyers
focused generally on language in Breyer's
opinion allowing judges considerable
leeway in looking at experts' credentials
and rejecting a more rigid approach used
by many lower court judges after the 1993
ruling that plaintiffs' lawyers said hurt
their cases.
"If the courts read this as an
instruction from up above to use some
common sense and flexibility, that's going
to help us," commented Jeffrey Robert
White of the Association of Trial Lawyers
of America.
Justice John Paul Stevens agreed with
the rest of the Supreme Court in Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael on the standards
for all expert testimony, but he dissented
in the part of the Alabama case that
endorsed the trial judge's exclusion of the
tire expert, saying the dispute should be
returned to lower courts for their
reconsideration.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer says trial
judges should weigh the "intellectual
rigor" and methodological soundness of
expert testimony.
Copyright 1999 C The Washington Post
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Last Term:
Esteban ORTIZ, et al., petitioners
V.
FIBREBOARD Corporation, et al
No. 97-1704
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 23, 1999
HIGH COURT OVERTURNS ASBESTOS SETTLEMENT
Ruling Limits Firms' Options in Class Actions
The Washington Post
Thursday, June 24, 1999
Sharon Walsh, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Supreme Court overturned a $ 1.5
billion asbestos settlement yesterday in a
decision that on two fronts makes it more
difficult for companies to resolve
thousands of lawsuits through a single
settlement. The justices ruled, 7 to 2, that
a company cannot limit the amount it is
willing to pay and that people in the group
with conflicting interests must have
separate lawyers.
The decision reined in a legal tool
increasingly used by manufacturers and
other defendants to settle claims seeking
damages for a class of people, potentially
affecting product-liability cases involving
tobacco, pacemakers and silicone breast
implants as well as civil rights and
employment discrimination cases.
Trial lawyers generally praised the
decision, saying companies had abused the
class action procedure to limit the size of
awards and protect themselves from
financial harm. But others said it will drag
out suits and leave victims waiting years
for resolution of a claim.
While various courts have been
extensively involved in crafting global
settlements in these massive cases, the
justices noted that only Congress can
change the law that defines the limits of
class actions. Justice David H. Souter,
writing for the majority, pleaded with
Congress to address the "elephantine
mass" of asbestos claims legislatively.
"This litigation defies customary
judicial administration and calls for
national legislation," Souter wrote at the
outset of his decision. In a footnote, he
added: "To date, Congress has not
responded." Yesterday was the third time
in a decade the court has asked for the
help of Congress in dealing with the issue.
In the case, Esteban Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., the justices overturned
a 1993 global class settlement involving
about 186,000 asbestos personal injury
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claims against the Fibreboard Corp., a
maker of vinyl siding that is now a
subsidiary of Owens Corning. In that
settlement, the company established a
limited fund to settle all claims. As part of
the agreement, no one in the class could
reject the settlement and sue the company
as an individual.
But the justices said if a company is
going to set aside limited money and not
allow what are known as opt-outs, the
fund must truly be limited. In this case,
insurance companes were providing most
of the funds for the settlement and
Fibreboard retained virtually all its net
worth. Thus, the justices said, the fund
could not be considered limited.
In addition, Souter noted that there
were a number of different types of
claimants, including those who are
currently sick and those who may get sick
in the future. In such cases, claimants with
different interests must be represented by
different lawyers, Souter said.
Asbestos causes a lung disease called
mesothelioma, which can have a latency
period of as much as 40 years, so people
currently in their sixties may have been
exposed to asbestos in oil fields or
shipyards decades ago and still not know
whether they will develop the disease.
"This is very, very important," said
Linda S. Mullenix, a professor at the
University of Texas School of Law and a
consultant on previous asbestos
settlements. "Every class action lawyer in
the country has been waiting for this
decision."
It will prevent companies from
"picking a number" to settle such cases,
said Laurence Tribe, the Harvard lawyer
who argued the case for the claimants
who opposed the settlement. And it will
mean that in all class action suits, people
with different interests will have to have
separate representation.
"This was a scary device," Tribe said,
"creating by agreement with an insurance
company a limited fund and selling down
the river the rights of all sorts of people."
"This is absolutely a huge victory for
asbestos victims, consumers and anybody
concerned about class action abuse," said
Arthur H. Bryant of the Trial Lawyers for
Public Justice, a group that is supported
by some of the country's biggest class
action lawyers.
Others disagreed.
"I don't think this is a big victory for
victims," said Mullenix, who said she
generally favors class action settlements.
"Asbestos victims have received nothing
after all these years. This is a case where
justice delayed is justice denied." Many
asbestos victims die before their claims
are settled.
Owens Corning, which bought
Fibreboard after the case had been
initiated, said it was pleased with the
outcome. The company, which also
formerly made asbestos, has already begun
a national settlement program to resolve
the claims.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist --
along with Justices Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sandra Day
O'Connor -- joined Souter in the decision.
Stephen G. Breyer and John Paul
Stevens dissented. Breyer wrote for the
two that in such complex cases, the
district court should be given the
discretion to reach an equitable resolution.
Although there have been various
legislative proposals over the years
regarding asbestos claims, none has ever
made it to the floor of Congress.
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"The majority of the Supreme Court is
saying that if asbestos is going to be
solved, Congress has to solve it," said one
lawyer who is not involved in this case.
But, he added: "Congress will never touch
this with a 10-foot pole. The trial lawyers
are too entrenched."
Copyright © 1999 The Washington Post
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THE SUPREME COURT: LIABILITY LAW
Justices Throw Out $1.5 Billion Asbestos Settlement, Citing Possible
Conflict of Interest
The New York Times
Thursday, June 24, 1999
Stephen Labaton
The Supreme Court today set aside a
$1.5 billion landmark settlement that was
to have resolved the claims of as many as
186,000 victims of asbestos poisoning
against the Fibreboard Corporation, one
of the leading makers of products using
the fire-retardant substance.
The Justices concluded that the
lawyers for the claimants had a possible
conflict of interest: getting the most for
their clients and striking a quick deal that
would garner huge legal fees. They also
found that in approving an agreement that
would have sharply limited any other
lawsuits brought against Fibreboard, the
lower court had failed to consider that
there was almost certainly more money
available for the claims, because
Fibreboard was only contributing
$500,000, with its insurers putting up the
rest. Fibreboard was sold to Owens
Corning two years ago for $515 million.
"It hardly appears that such a regime
is the best that can be provided for class
members," Justice David H. Souter wrote
in the majority opinion.
The 7-to-2 decision clarified the
standards for class-action lawsuits and
raised the barriers for corporations
seeking to resolve large and complex
product-liability cases involving tobacco,
breast implants and handguns.
In recent years, companies that have
been sued in class-action cases over
cigarettes, orthopedic bone screws, diet
pills and pesticides have tried to limit their
liability by striking settlements that
prohibit any current or future claimants
from dropping out of the cases to file
their own suits. But today's decision will
make it far more difficult for companies
to reach such settlements without either
paying top dollar or resorting to
bankruptcy protection, as some
defendants in asbestos and other large
cases in have done in the past to limit
their liability.
The decision was also a repudiation of
a small group of plaintiffs' lawyers who
had tried to settle the cases facing I
Fibreboard, which had managed through
skillful negotiation and legal tactics to
structure a deal in which its insurers
would have paid virtually all of the costs.
The $1.535 billion deal at the center of
today's decision was struck in August
1993, on the eve of an important appeals
court hearing, in Tyler, Tex.
Both the majority opinion and
concurring and dissenting opinions called
on Congress to find a solution to "the
elephantine mass of asbestos cases" and
expressed deep frustration with the
procedural rules that have limited the
ability of judges to resolve the asbestos
litigation crisis facing state and Federal
courts.
The final toll of asbestos-related
health problems remains unknown, in
large part because illnesses often occur
many years after exposure, although one
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judicial study concluded that there may be
as many as 265,000 deaths by the year
2015 and many millions more health
problems from exposure to asbestos.
The court cases, while largely failing to
resolve hundreds of thousands of claims,
have cost millions of dollars in lawyers'
bills that might otherwise have been used
to help victims. Indeed, the judicial study
described in today's opinions noted that
61 cents of every dollar that might
otherwise be available for victims of
asbestos exposure was now going to
lawyers and other litigation costs.
While the House Judiciary Committee
is set to hold hearings next week on
legislation that would set up an
administrative agency to resolve asbestos
claims, opposition from trial lawyers, the
A.F.L.-C.I.0 and some asbestos
manufacturers has blocked such
legislation in the past.
Fibreboard was a defendant in one of
the first asbestos cases filed, in 1967,
against a group of asbestos makers and
users. The company has been a defendant
in many cases because from the 1920s
through 1971 it made a variety of
products containing asbestos, mostly for
high-temperature industrial applications.
Today's decision, Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corporation, No. 97-1704, was the second
time in two years that the Supreme Court
had analyzed the class-action rules
embodied in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to strike down a major
asbestos settlement. In 1997, the Justices
threw out a $1.3 billion class action
settlement that had been reached by 20
large asbestos makers.
In that case, Amchem Products v.
Windsor, the Court concluded that the
asbestos victims had interests that were
too diverse to be represented in a single
class-action lawsuit. The Justices also
found a conflict in the way the settlement
treated current asbestos victims and those
whose exposure to asbestos had not yet
resulted in serious illness.
Five days after handing down the
Amchem decision, the Justices asked the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, sitting in Texas, to apply its
principles in reconsidering the $1.5 billion
settlement in the Fibreboard case. In
contrast to the Amchem settlement, the
Fibreboard deal was binding on all current
and future claimants against the company
on the theory that there was a highly
limited amount of money that was
available to Fibreboard.
In part because of these differences,
the Fifth Circuit appeared to give short
shrift to the Supreme Court's decision in
the Amchem case, affirming the
Fibreboard settlement in a five-paragraph
opinion.
But in asking the Supreme Court to
reverse the appeals court, Professor
Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard Law School
began his brief in rather unorthodox style.
"Some people just can't take a hint," he
wrote of the appeals court.
Today, the majority of the Supreme
Court agreed that the Fifth Circuit court
had largely ignored its 1997 Amchem
ruling. Justice Souter's opinion was laced
with criticisms of the reasoning of the
appeals court and district court that had
approved the settlement.
The Justices faulted the lower courts
for failing to undertake an independent
evaluation of the potential insurance
funds available, simply accepting the
settlement terms at face value. While a
proposed settlement might ordinarily be
good evidence of the amount of money
available for claims, the court said, the
potentially huge fees for the plaintiffs'
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lawyers might have unfairly tainted the
agreement.
"In a strictly rational world, plaintiffs'
counsel would always press for the limit
of what the defense would pay," the Court
wrote. "But with an already enormous fee
within counsel's grasp, zeal for the client
may relax sooner than it would in a case
brought on behalf of one claimant."
The Court concluded that the
proposed settlement's distribution scheme
was unfair and that it had unfairly
excluded too many actual and potential
asbestos victims. The Justices also said
that by only giving up $500,000,
Fibreboard had failed to supply enough
money to justify the requirement that no
claimants covered by the settlement be
permitted to sue on their own terms.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by
Justice John Paul Stevens, argued in a
dissenting opinion that the alternative to
the settlement would not be an
opportunity for each potential plaintiff to
have his or her own day in court.
"Unusually high litigation costs,
unusually long delays, and limitations
upon the total amount of resources
available for payment, together mean that
most potential plaintiffs may not have a
realistic alternative," Justice Breyer wrote.
Justices Breyer and Stevens
maintained that the Court should have
given more latitude to district courts to
find remedies to resolve the explosion of
asbestos litigation. Justice Breyer also
concluded that the settlement would have
made far more money available to the
claimants than they might otherwise have
gotten as long as Congress failed to
address the issue.
Copyright C 1999 The New York Times
Company
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Last Term:
AT & T Corporation, petitioners
V.
IOWA Utilities Board, et aL
No. 97-826
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided January 25, 1999
HIGH COURT SAYS FCC TO SET TELEPHONE RULES
Iowa Utilities Regulators Had Said They Should Decide How Rates Are
Set When Local Phone Fitms Lease Networks
The Des Moines Register
Tuesday, January 26, 1999
Kevin O'Donoghue, Register Business Writer
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday
ruled that the Federal Communications
Commission, not state regulators, will set
the ground rules for opening local
telephone service to competition.
The Iowa Utilities Board and other
state utilities regulators had maintained
that they should decide how rates are set
when local phone companies lease their
networks to competitors.
"What we were trying to do is say
these are issues of local concern," said
Diane Munns, general counsel for the
state agency.
The ruling was not expected to result
in any significant changes to rates paid by
local telephone service customers in Iowa,
said Chuck Seel, customer service
manager the Utilities Board.
U.S. West Communications said in a
statement that it had supported the states
because "we believe state regulators are
better judges of what's best for their
specific states."
For example, operating local phone
service networks in a rural state with some
thinly populated areas is more expensive
than doing so in a densely populated state,
U.S. West spokeswoman Lynn Gipple
said.
Therefore, the company thinks state
regulators should decide how to set the
rates that local phone service providers
charge for their networks.
At issue was whether the FCC had
jurisdiction to implement the local
competition provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.
In deciding that it did, the high court
overturned a decision by the 8t Circuit
Court of Appeals.
AT&T vs. Iowa Utilities Board
became the test case for the conflict after
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long distance carriers sued regulators in
multiple states that were trying to regulate
the wholesale leasing of local phone
companies' networks.
The Utilities Board has approved 19
companies to offer local telephone service
in addition to existing providers. But
those providing service have typically
gone after only commercial customers,
Gipple said.
Copyright C 1999 The Des Moines
Register, Inc.
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DIVIDED COURT SAYS FCC CAN SET RULES FOR LOCAL
PHONE COMPETITON
The Legal Inteli encer
Tuesday, January 26, 1999
Richard Carelli, Associated Press
WASHINGTON - The Supreme Court
yesterday reinstated federal rules aimed at
quickly opening the $110 billion local
telephone market to competition.
The court, in splintered voting, said a
1996 law lets the Federal Communications
Commission set pricing rules for long-
distance companies and others that want to
start offering local phone service. The ruling
is a big, although not complete, victory for
the government's goal of speedily letting
customers nationwide choose their local
phone companies much as they now can
choose long-distance companies. The
Clinton administration had argued that such
competition will happen sooner if price
rules are set by the federal government
rather than by each of the 50 states. State
regulators and companies that now
monopolize local phone service had said the
pricing rules must be set by the states.
Writing for the court, Justice Antonin Scalia
said the Federal Communications
Commission has general jurisdiction to
implement the local-competition provisions
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. "It
would be gross understatement to say that
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is not
a model of clarity," Scalia wrote. "It is in
many important respects a model of
ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction.
... But Congress is well aware that the
ambiguities it chooses to produce in a
statute will be resolved by the implementing
agency. ... We can only enforce the clear
limits that the 1996 act contains," Scalia
added. Although they lost yesterday, state
regulators and local phone companies still
can return to a lower court and
challenge the substance of the federal
rules. In all, four of the eight court
members wrote opinions in the case.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who long
has owned AT&T stock, did not
participate in the decision. The court
also upheld most of the FCC's rules
aimed at prohibiting local phone
companies from separating parts of
their network and then requiring a
customer who leases those parts to pay
the cost of reassembling them. The
commission contends that such
"unbundling" imposes unneeded costs
on a competitor. But the justices said
the FCC "did not adequately consider"
all factors when it passed a rule
requiring a local phone company to
provide competitors with access to
various local network elements. The
court concluded that the comrmssion's
Rule 319 is inconsistent with the 1996
law. The court also ruled that the
commission can impose a "pick and
choose" rule on local phone companies,
which allows competitors to buy or
lease any service or network element
under the same terms as they were
provided under any previous agreement
without having to accept the entire
agreement. Supporters of local phone
competition hope it will lead to lower
prices like the 70 percent drop in long-
distance costs after competition was
introduced during the 19 80s.yesterday's
ruling reversed key portions of a federal
appeals court decision that said the FCC
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could not regulate the prices competitors
must pay to connect to local phone
companies' networks. Joining the federal
government in supporting the FCC price
rules were long-distance companies,
including AT&T and MCI, that hope to
begin offering local phone service.
Opposing the federal rules were state utility
regulators and existing local phone
monopolies such as Bell Atlantic and
BellSouth. The vote to let the FCC set the
pricing rules was 5-3. Joining Scalia were
Justices John Paul Stevens, David H.
Souter, Anthony M. Kennedy and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg. Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist and Justices Clarence
Thomas and Stephen G. Breyer
dissented. The voting on other aspects
of the dispute also was split.
Copyright C 1999 American Lawyer
Media
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FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION
V.
BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION ETAL.
Does the FDA Have the Authoity to Regulate Tobacco?
Matthew Frey *
Perhaps having thought it had performed satisfactory penance when it last year agreed to
settle for $206 billion a lawsuit launched by 40 states to recover their costs in treating ill
smokers, the American tobacco industry today finds itself heading into the 21st century with
its prospects more in doubt than at any time in recent memory.
Amid the news that a Miami jury recently sided with scores of Florida smokers in the
first class action lawsuit filed by smokers to come to trial, and widespread concern over how
that jury's damages award might influence the course of future tobacco litigation, the
tobacco industry finds itself having this upcoming term to defend a Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision that reversed District Judge William L. Osteen Sr.'s 1997 opinion granting
authority to the Food and Drug Administration to regulate tobacco products.
"It will be the most important public health case the Supreme Court hears in decades,"
said Dr. David Kessler, a pediatrician and lawyer who oversaw the formulation of the FDA's
tobacco regulations when he headed the agency in the mid-1990's.
The FDA had claimed jurisdiction over tobacco products under the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) after the agency ruled that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
constituted "combination products," products which exhibit characteristics, in this case, of
both drugs and devices, two categories the FDCA granted the FDA power to regulate.
Writing for the 2-1 majority, however, Fourth Circuit Judge H. Emory Widener Jr.
criticized the FDA for basing its decision to pursue jurisdiction over tobacco products
merely on the "definitions section" of the FDCA, and ignoring the true reasons Congress
passed the FDCA in 1938. "We are of [the] opinion that the FDA's limited, mechanistic
inquiry is insufficient to determine Congress' intent," the court wrote, later citing the
landmark Supreme Court case Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, whose two-part test
requires courts to scrutinize legislative intent before passing judgment on whether an
agency's interpretation is "permissible."
The majority noted that the lower court had been correct to seek answers in the FDCA's
legislative history but had picked the wrong question to ask. The issue at hand, Judge
Widener wrote, invoking a distinction familiar to students of administrative law, was not
"whether Congress has evidenced its clear intent to withhold from FDA jurisdiction [the
authority] to regulate tobacco products," but "whether Congress intended to delegate such
jurisdiction to the FDA." In other words, contrary to the district court, the appeals court
ruled that its inquiry into the legislative history of the FDCA should proceed under the
presumption that Congress had not intended to grant the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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Finding nothing in the FDCA's legislative history to contradict their presumption, the
majority ruled that Congress' intent was clear. "Congress did not intend to delegate
jurisdiction over tobacco products to the FDA," Judge Widener wrote. Yet even if Congress
had intended to grant jurisdiction to the FDA, the court suggested, it had done a poor job of
it, since the FDA's claimed authority over tobacco subverted the agency's basic regulatory
mlission.
Pursuing this fundamental discrepancy, the majority wondered how the FDA would
square its mission to protect the public from unsafe and ineffective drugs and devices with
its new authority to regulate tobacco products-products the FDA sought to regulate
precisely because it had judged them "dangerous, unsafe, and the cause of 'great pain and
suffering' . . . ." "[Tjhe FDA cannot comply with the terms of the very statutory provision it
has chosen as it basis for regulation," the majority concluded, chiding the FDA for the
"obvious sophistry" it employed in an effort to circumvent this catch-22. If nothing else,
the FDA's argument on this point reinforced the main thrust of the majority's opinion.
"Again, the contortions that the FDA has gone through demonstrate that Congress did not
intend its jurisdictional grant to the FDA to extend to tobacco products," the court wrote.
Senior U.S. Circuit Judge Kenneth K. Hall, writing in dissent, disagreed with the relative
weight the majority assigned to the text and legislative history of the FDCA. He criticized
his colleagues for overlooking a common-sense reading of the language of the statute in
favor of a legislative history clouded by recent disclosures of material contained in secret
tobacco industry documents.
"While as much as conceding that tobacco products fit the FDCA's 'literal' definition of
drug," Judge Hall wrote, "the majority concentrates instead on what it believes is abundant
evidence elsewhere demonstrating that Congress has never intended that tobacco come
under FDA authority." Despite the majority's reliance on evidence that Congress and the
FDA had been traditionally reluctant to assert jurisdiction over tobacco, the dissent
continued, times had changed. "No other court . .. has been confronted with the type and
quantity of evidence collected during the rulemaking process in this case," Judge Hall began.
"[Tihe strength of nicotine's addictive qualities, the extent of the health problems created by
tobacco products, and the complicity of the manufacturers bring us to a different place than
we have been before."
In Judge Hall's view, the majority failed to discern that Congress had chosen inherently
flexible language in which to fix its legislative intent. "The operative congressional intent
[behind the FDCA] was simply to confer broad discretionary powers on the FDA to regulate
'drugs' and 'devices.' The FDCA was written broadly enough to accommodate both new
products and evolving knowledge about existing ones, and it was written that way on
purpose."
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Ruling below (4h Cir., 153 F.3d 155, 67 U.S.L.W. 1005):
Food and Drug Administration's authority under Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to regulate
"drugs" and "devices" does not extend to access restrictions and labeling requirements for
tobacco products.
Question presented: Given FDA's findings, are tobacco products subject to regulation
under Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as "drugs" and "devices"?
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WIDENER, Circuit Judge.
On August 28, 1996, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) published a
final rule entitled "Regulations Restricting
the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes
and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect
Children and Adolescents." * * * In
general, this rule set out regulations
restricting the sale and distribution of
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
(collectively referred to as "tobacco
products") to minors and limiting the
advertising and promotion of tobacco
products. Plaintiffs (cigarette and
smokeless tobacco manufacturers,
convenience store retailers, and
advertisers) filed these consolidated
actions in federal district court,
challenging the FDA's jurisdiction over
tobacco products and seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. ** * Plaintiffs then
filed a motion for summary judgment in
the district court, alleging that, as a matter
of law: (1) Congress has withheld from
the FDA the jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco products as marketed by
plaintiffs; and (2) the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (Act) does not permit
the FDA to regulate tobacco products
either as drugs or as devices. In denying
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
in part and granting the motion in part,
the district court held that Congress did
not "[intend] to withhold from FDA" the
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.
* * * The district court also concluded
that the FDA had authority to regulate
tobacco products under the device
provision of the Act, but disapproved the
FDA's restrictions on advertising as
inconsistent with its statutory authority.
* * * Finally, the district court stayed
implementation of the majority of the
FDA's regulations pending appeal. * * *
Because this case arises from a motion
for summary judgment, we review the
judgment of the district court de novo.
* * * For purposes of these appeals,
plaintiffs do not dispute the factual
findings of the FDA. Based on our review
of the record and the relevant legal
authorities, we are of opinion that the
FDA lacks jurisdiction to regulate tobacco
products. For the reasons set forth
below, all of the FDA's August 28, 1996
regulations of tobacco products are thus
invalid. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the district court.
I. FDA's Asserted Basis for
Jurisdiction
The FDA * * * has authority to
regulate products only if they fall within
one of the categories defined by Congress
in the Act. * * * [The categories of
products subject to regulation by the FDA
are food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics.]
In the jurisdictional determination
attached to its August 28, 1996
regulations, the FDA asserted jurisdiction
over tobacco products under the drug
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* * * and device * ** definitions in the
Act. * * *
According to the FDA, tobacco
products fit within these definitions
because they are "intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body."
More specifically, the FDA concluded that
tobacco products are "combination
products consisting of nicotine, a drug
that causes addiction and other significant
pharmacological effects on the human
body, and device components that deliver
nicotine to the body." *** Based on its
classification of tobacco products as
combination products, the FDA claimed
that it could exercise its discretion in
deciding whether the drug provisions or
device provisions of the Act should apply.
* * * Although finding that tobacco
products function primarily as drugs,
* * * the FDA concluded that tobacco
products are most properly regulated
under the device provisions of the Act, in
particular the restricted devices section.
* * * The FDA's jurisdictional
determination encompasses over 600
pages in the Federal Register; however, its
basic premise can be fairly summarized in
one sentence. That is, the FDA asserted
jurisdiction over tobacco products based
on its conclusion that tobacco products fit
within the literal definitions of drug and
device as set forth in the Act. In short, the
FDA's inquiry began and ended with the
definitions section of the Act.
We are of opinion that the FDA's
limited, mechanistic inquiry is insufficient
to determine Congress' intent. Therefore,
as directed by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
* * * we employ the traditional tools of
statutory construction to ascertain
congressional intent regarding whether the
FDA has authority to regulate tobacco
products.
II. Jurisdictional Analysis
We begin with the basic proposition
that agency power is "not the power to
make law. Rather, it is 'the power to
adopt regulations to carry into effect the
will of Congress as expressed by the
statute.' " * * * Thus, our initial inquiry is
whether Congress intended to delegate to
the FDA authority to regulate tobacco
products as "customarily marketed." ***
The district court framed the issue as
"whether Congress has evidenced its clear
intent to withhold from FDA jurisdiction
to regulate tobacco products as
customarily marketed." * * * However,
we are of opinion that the issue is
correctly framed as whether Congress
intended to delegate such jurisdiction to
the FDA. * * * This fundamental
misconception by the district court of the
principal issue in the case unavoidably
skewed the remainder of its analysis.
Applying the principles set forth by
the Supreme Court in Chevron, we examine
whether Congress intended to give the
FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products.
Under Chevrmn, we first consider the intent
of Congress because "[I]f the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress." * * * It is only if the intent of
Congress is ambiguous that we defer to a
permissible interpretation by the agency.
* * * And we note, with emphasis, that
the Supreme Court has stated that "[a]
precondition to deference under Chevron
is a congressional delegation of
administrative authority." * * *
Accordingly, no deference is due the
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FDA's construction of the Act unless it is
acting within the bounds of its
congressionally-established authority. If
the court can ascertain Congress' intent
on a particular question by applying the
traditional rules of statutory construction,
then it must give effect to that intent. * *
We also note that ascertaining
congressional intent is of particular
importance where, as here, an agency is
attempting to expand the scope of its
jurisdiction. * * *
Although the task of statutory
construction generally begins with the
actual language of the provision in
question, *** the inquiry does not end
there. * ** The Supreme Court has
often emphasized the crucial role of
context as a tool of statutory construction.
For example, the Court has stated that
when construing a statute, courts "must
not be guided by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its
object and policy." *** Thus, the
traditional rules of statutory construction
to be used in ascertaining congressional
intent include: the overall statutory
scheme; *** legislative history; "the
history of evolving congressional
regulation in the area"[;] * * and a
consideration of other relevant statutes.
* * * With these general principles in
mind, we begin our inquiry into the issue
of whether Congress intended to delegate
jurisdiction over tobacco products to the
FDA.
A. Intrinsic Evidence
The FDA correctly contends that the
language of the statute must be the
starting point of our analysis. We agree
that the first step of statutory construction
is determining the plain meaning of the
statutory text. In fact, the Court instructs
that the inquiry ends with the statutory
language when the language is
unambiguous and "the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent." ***
However, the flaw in the limited
approach suggested by the FDA and
taken by the district court is that they
examine only the literal meaning of the
statutory definitions of drug and device.
A mechanical reading of only the
definitions provisions may appear to
support the government's position that
tobacco products fit within the Act's
definitions of drugs or devices. However,
an initial problem with the government's
theory is that the definitions of drug and
device require not only that the article
"affect the structure or any function of
the body," but also that these effects be
intended. * * * As noted by the district
court, "no court has ever found that a
product is 'intended for use' or 'intended
to affect' within the meaning of the [Act]
absent manufacturer claims as to that
product's use." * * * Even the FDA does
not contend that tobacco manufacturers
make any such claims. * * *
Even if we were to accept the FDA's
position that no other inquiry is
permissible if tobacco products fall within
the literal definition of drug or device, the
jurisdictional inquiry would not end there.
Both the FDA and the district court failed
to examine the literal definitions in view
of the language and structure of the Act as
a whole. Such holistic approach to
statutory construction is well-supported
by the case law. * * * Accordingly, our
task is to examine whether tobacco
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products fit into the overall regulatory
scheme created by Congress.
According to FDA Deputy
Commissioner Schultz, "[a] fundamental
precept of drug and device regulation in
this country is that these products must be
proven safe and effective before they can
be sold." * * * In fact, the FDA's
congressionally-established mission
statement provides that the FDA is
charged with protecting the public health
by ensuring that human drugs are "safe
and effective" and that "there is a
reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness of devices intended for
human use." * * * During its rulemaking,
the FDA found that tobacco products are
"dangerous," "unsafe," and the cause of
"great pain and suffering from illness such
as cancer, respiratory illnesses, and heart
disease." * * * In addition, the FDA
determined that over 400,000 people die
each year from tobacco use. * * * Yet,
the FDA has proposed to regulate
tobacco products under a statutory
provision that requires conditions on sale
and distribution which provide a
reasonable assurance of safety. * * *
According to the FDA, a determination of
safety under the Act requires
consideration of the risks of a product
compared to the "countervailing effects of
use of that product, including the
consequences of not permitting the
product to be marketed." * * * Thus, the
FDA concluded that withdrawal of
tobacco from the market poses significant
health risks to addicted adults which
outweigh the risks of leaving tobacco
products on the market. * * *
But that test is contrary to the statute.
The statutory provision * * * provides that
safety and effectiveness are to be
determined by "weighing any probable
benefit to health from the use of the
device against any probable risk of injury
or illness from such use." * * *
According to the language of [the statute]
the FDA's obligation is to strike a balance
between the risks and benefits of the use
of a certain product, not to weigh the risks
of leaving a product on the market against
the risks of taking a product off the
market. The FDA is unable to state any
real health benefit derived from leaving
tobacco products on the market. This is
not to say that there are not other public
policy reasons, such as impact on the
national economy and the potential for a
black market, weighing against a ban on
tobacco products. However, this type of
decision involving countervailing national
policy concerns is just the type of decision
left for Congress. By statute, the FDA's
authority is limited to the balancing of
health benefits and risks. * * * Thus, its
attempted analogy between tobacco
products and chemotherapy drugs is not
well taken. * * * These cancer-fighting
drugs may be considered high-risk, but
they have not been deemed "unsafe" by
the FDA. Under the Act, the key to
allowing these drugs to remain on the
market is that their use produces
affirmative health benefits which
outweigh their risks. * * According to
the FDA's own findings, tobacco
products do not meet this test, for there is
no health benefit from the use of tobacco.
The FDA's inquiry into whether the risks
of removing tobacco products from the
market are greater than the risks of leaving
them on the market is irrelevant under
[the statute].
In the proposed regulations, the FDA
characterized tobacco products as
combination products containing drug
and device components, but purported to
regulate tobacco products as restricted
devices under § 360j(e) of the Act.
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Section 360j(e) permits the FDA to place
restrictions on the sale, distribution or use
of a product which are necessary for a
"reasonable assurance of safety" of the
product. * * * However, based on the
FDA's characterization of tobacco
products as unsafe, it is impossible to
create regulations which will provide a
reasonable assurance of safety. Thus, the
FDA cannot comply with the terms of the
very statutory provision it has chosen as
its basis for regulation. In addition to the
fundamental conflicts described above, at
least six internal inconsistencies arise
when tobacco products are forced into the
drug or device regulatory schemes of the
Act.
First, § 355(a) of the Act requires that
all new drugs be approved by the FDA
before marketing. * * * The Act requires
the FDA to disapprove applications for
new drugs if the drug is deemed unsafe or
if there is not substantial evidence of its
effectiveness. * * * This mandatory
approval process presents an
insurmountable problem for the FDA
with respect to tobacco products because
of the FDA's finding that they are unsafe.
* * * In fact, the FDA has conceded that
under the mandatory approval provisions,
tobacco products would constitute
unapproved new drugs. * * * As such,
the Act would require the prohibition of
the distribution and marketing of tobacco
products. * * *
The FDA attempts to avoid the
problem inherent in the new drug
approval requirement by classifying
tobacco products as combination
products and then choosing to regulate
them as devices rather than as drugs. The
Act directs the FDA to determine the
primary mode of action of a combination
product. * * If the FDA determines
that the primary mode of action is that of
a drug, then it must assign "primary
jurisdiction" over the product to the
persons charged with premarket review of
drugs. *** The FDA concedes that the
"primary mode of action" of tobacco
products is that of a drug. * * * Yet, it
chose to regulate tobacco products
devices under § 360j(e) of the Act. This
transparent action by the FDA, obvious
sophistry, taken in order to avoid the new
drug provisions of the Act, reinforces the
conclusion that regulation of tobacco
products under the Act was not intended
by Congress. However, the FDA's
classification of tobacco products as
devices could not avoid similar problems
caused by other provisions of the Act.
Section 331(a) of the Act prohibits the
introduction into or delivery in interstate
commerce of any drug or device that is
misbranded. *** Under § 352(j), a drug
or device is deemed to be misbranded if it
is dangerous to health when used in the
manner suggested in the labeling. * * *
The FDA has concluded that the use of
tobacco products is dangerous to health.
* * * Thus, it is impossible for the
labeling of tobacco products to suggest a
nondangerous use. Accordingly, §§ 331 (a)
and 352(j) operate to make the continued
marketing of tobacco products illegal.
A drug or device is also considered
misbranded, and thus prohibited under (
331(a), if it does not include "adequate
directions for use." * * * According to
the FDA, the requirement of adequate
directions for use means "directions under
which the layman can use a device safely
and for the purposes for which it is
intended." *** The FDA can exempt
drugs and devices from § 352(f)(1)'s
directions requirement, but only if the
information is "not necessary for the
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protection of public health." * * * The
FDA has previously interpreted § 352(f)
to mean that an exemption from the
direction requirements may be granted
when other circumstances (such as a
physician's prescription) can reasonably
assure safe use of the drug or device. ***
The FDA now contends that an
exemption for tobacco products is
appropriate, *** because everyone knows
how to use tobacco products and thus
directions are not needed. * * *
However, the FDA violated its own
interpretation of the Act by exempting
tobacco products under § 352(f) without
any assurances of safety. Because of the
FDA's finding that tobacco products are
unsafe, * * * it is impossible to provide
directions for safe use as required by the
statute. In addition, the exemption is
inapplicable because no assurance of
safety can be given for inherently unsafe
products such as tobacco. Again, the
FDA's need to apply the statutory
exemption demonstrates that the Act does
not and cannot apply to tobacco products.
Similarly, a drug or device is also
considered misbranded, and thus
prohibited by § 331(a), if it fails to bear
"adequate warnings against use . .. by
children where its use may be dangerous
to health." * * * Unlike § 352(f)(1), this
section does not permit any exemptions
from the warning requirement. In
support of its proposed regulations, the
FDA cited widespread use of tobacco
products by minors and focused on
controlling youth use as a means of
decreasing tobacco-related illnesses and
deaths. * * * The FDA concluded that
the warnings mandated by other federal
statutes satisfy the Act's requirement for
adequate warnings to children even
though none of the statutorily-prescribed
warnings address the particular dangers of
youth use repeatedly emphasized by the
FDA. * * * The FDA was constrained to
find that the warnings mandated by other
federal statutes are sufficient because the
applicable federal statutes do not permit
federal agencies to add to or modify the
congressionally-mandated warnings. ** *
Again, the contortions that the FDA has
gone through demonstrate that Congress
did not intend its jurisdictional grant to
the FDA to extend to tobacco products.
Furthermore, under 21 U.S.C. §
360c(b)(1), all devices intended for human
use must be classified into one of three
categories, Class I, II, or III, based on
ascending degrees of dangerousness.
Placement is appropriate in the class that
will provide a "reasonable assurance of
the safety and effectiveness of the device."
* * * As discussed above, safety and
effectiveness are determined by "weighing
any probable benefit to health from the
use of the device against any probable risk
of injury or illness from such use." ** *
Three years after it first introduced the
proposed regulations, the FDA has yet to
place tobacco products into one of the
three categories. However, the agency's
own findings with respect to dangers to
health require classification of tobacco
products as a Class III device subject to
premarket approval because they
"[present] a potential unreasonable risk of
illness or injury." * * * Under the
premarket approval process, tobacco
products could not be approved without a
showing that there is a reasonable
assurance of safety and effectiveness of
the products when used in the manner
suggested by the labeling. * * * The FDA
contends that it will classify tobacco
products at some point in the future and
that the long delay is consistent with both
the statutory framework and the agency's
prior actions for other devices. ***
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However, the real problem with
attempting a classification is that all three
categories of devices require reasonable
assurances of safety and effectiveness for
the product. * * * As discussed earlier,
the FDA cannot provide reasonable
assurances of safety for a product that it
has found to be inherently unsafe and
dangerous. Thus, it has not, and more
importantly, cannot comply with
Congress' statutory classification directive
because complying with the statute would
trigger a ban on tobacco products, a result
not intended by Congress.
Finally, the Act requires the FDA to
issue an immediate cease-distribution
order for all products found to cause
"serious, adverse health consequences or
death." * * * This order begins an agency
process that may ultimately result in a
recall order for the device. * * * The
FDA has found that "tobacco use is the
single leading cause of preventable death
in the United States. More than 400,000
people die each year from tobacco-related
illnesses, such as cancer, respiratory
illnesses, and heart disease, often suffering
long and painful deaths." * * *
According to the terms of the Act, these
findings, standing alone, mandate that the
FDA issue a cease-distribution order for
tobacco products. Nevertheless, the FDA
has no intention of complying with the
requirements of the Act. *** The
necessity of the FDA's avoidance of the
statutory directives again demonstrates
that Congress did not intend that the Act
regulate tobacco products. A faithful
application of the statutory language
would lead to a ban on tobacco
products-a result not intended by
Congress.
The FDA makes a linguistic argument
in an attempt to avoid the problem
presented by this section. The statute
provides that if the FDA finds there is a
reasonable probability that a device will
cause health problems or death, then the
FDA "shall issue an order requiring ...
[the immediate] cease distribution of such
device." * * * However, the FDA
contends that "shall" should be
interpreted to mean "may." *** Even if
we were to adopt this interpretation, the
substance of our analysis would not
change. As discussed above, the FDA has
made the requisite finding of
dangerousness under the statute. Thus,
even if "shall" were interpreted as "may,"
the FDA still could exercise its discretion
under the statute and ban tobacco
products. And a failure to ban a product
as dangerous as is tobacco, by the FDA's
own findings, would necessarily be an
abuse of discretion. But because an
absolute ban falls outside the scope of
congressional intent, construing the Act to
cover tobacco products would be
inconsistent with the will of Congress.
As demonstrated by the examples
provided above, the FDA's need to
maneuver around the obstacles created by
the operative provisions of the Act
reflects congressional intent not to include
tobacco products within the scope of the
FDA's authority. The FDA argues that
even if it has misapplied the Act, this error
does not bear on the jurisdictional issue.
However, the point is not merely that the
FDA misapplied the Act, but these
examples demonstrate the FDA's need to
ignore and misapply the operative
provisions of the Act before it can attain
its end, not the end contemplated by
Congress. * * * The fact is that Congress
did not equip the FDA with tools
appropriate for the regulation of tobacco
because it had no intention that the Act
apply to tobacco products.
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We do not dispute in this case that
Congress has charged the FDA with
protecting the public health and that
tobacco products present serious health
risks for the public. However, the
Supreme Court has warned that "[n our
anxiety to effectuate the congressional
purpose of protecting the public, we must
take care not to extend the scope of the
statute beyond the point where Congress
indicated it would stop." * * * Based on
our examination of the regulatory scheme
created by Congress, we are of opinion
that the FDA is attempting to stretch the
Act beyond the scope intended by
Congress.
B. Extrinsic Evidence
[The court here traces Congressional
and FDA attitudes toward regulating
tobacco over the past century, and
concludes that legislative inaction,
combined with the FDA's historical
reluctance to assume authority over
tobacco products, "provide strong
evidence of congressional intent that it,
and not the FDA, controls the regulation
of tobacco products."]
III. Conclusion
This is not a case about whether
additional or different regulations are
needed to address legitimate concerns
about the serious health problems related
to tobacco use, and particularly youth
tobacco use, in this country. At its core,
this case is about who has the power to
make this type of major policy decision.
As the Supreme Court has previously
stated about a different agency and its
enabling statute, neither federal agencies
nor the courts can substitute their policy
judgments for those of Congress.
In rejecting the agency's interpretation of
its enabling statute, the MCI Court
characterized the agency's action as
"effectively the introduction of a whole
new regime of regulation ... which may
well be a better regime but is not the one
that Congress established." * * *
Accordingly, we do not, indeed cannot,
pass judgment on the merits of the
regulatory scheme proposed by the FDA.
By its ultra vires action, the FDA has
exceeded the authority granted to it by
Congress, and its rulemaking action
cannot stand.
We are thus of opinion that Congress did
not intend to delegate jurisdiction over
tobacco products to the FDA.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court is
REVERSED.
K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
The FDCA delegates to the FDA the
duty of promulgating and enforcing
regulations aimed at protecting the
nation's citizens from misbranded and
unsafe drugs and food. After years of
considering an array of evidence, much of
it only recently brought to light, the FDA
decided to regulate a product that is
estimated to cause some 400,000 deaths a
year. While not actually disputing that
tobacco products deliver a drug, nicotine,
into the body, the majority would deny to
the FDA the authority to act to address
this acknowledged health threat. I dissent.
Tobacco products fit comfortably into
the FDCA's definitions of "drug" and
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"device." Inasmuch as cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco are responsible for
illness and death on a vast scale, FDA
regulations aimed at curbing tobacco use
by children cannot possibly be contrary to
the general intent of the FDCA to protect
the public health. But even when we
expand our search for legislative intent
beyond the words of the statute, the
evidence falls far short of demonstrating
that Congress intended to deny or
withdraw jurisdiction over tobacco from
the FDA. Therefore, on the major
question before us, I would affirm the
district court's denial of summary
judgment to the companies to the extent
such judgment turns on the issue of the
FDA's authority to regulate tobacco
products.
on to a discussion of the "context" of the
FDCA.
A
The rulemaking record contains
voluminous evidence of the
pharmacological effects of nicotine; in
addition to being highly addictive, nicotine
acts as a stimulant, tranquilizer and
appetite suppressant. * * * Under these
assumed facts, nicotine clearly "affect[s]
the structure or function of the body of
man . .. ", and I do not understand the
majority to be saying otherwise. The only
arguable impediment to a complete fit
between the terms of the statute and
tobacco products is the word "intended."
B
I
The majority devotes approximately
three paragraphs to the words that form
the heart of the FDA's jurisdictional
claim: "[T]he term 'drug' means ... articles
(other than food) intended to affect the
structure or function of the body." * * *
While as much as conceding that tobacco
products fit the FDCA's "literal"
definition of drug, the majority
concentrates instead on what it believes is
abundant evidence elsewhere
demonstrating that Congress has never
intended that tobacco come under FDA
authority. Despite the apparent
agreement about the "literal" meaning of
"drug" and "device," a few words are
necessary to set the stage before moving
Building on the conclusion that the
nicotine in tobacco products is highly
addictive, the FDA proffered four
independent rationales to satisfy the
additional requirement that tobacco
products be "intended" to affect the body:
(1) a reasonable manufacturer would
foresee that consumers would use the
product to satisfy addiction; * * * (2)
most consumers do in fact use tobacco
products to satisfy addiction; * * * (3) the
manufacturers have long known that
consumers use the products for the
pharmacological effects; *** and (4) the
manufacturers design the products to
deliver active doses of nicotine. ** On
reasoning with which I agree, the district
court held that the FDA could proffer
evidence in support of the first and
second of these rationales. * * * In
addition, I would also permit the use of
recently disclosed evidence, including
heretofore-secret company documents,
that establish that the companies have
known about the addictive qualities of
their products for years and that cigarettes
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are deliberately manipulated to create and
sustain addiction to nicotine.
My dictionary contains the following
definitions of "intend": "1. To have in
mind: PLAN. 2a. To design for a
particular purpose. B. To have in mind for
a particular purpose." WEBSTER'S II
NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY
DICTIONARY (1984). As a matter of
simple English, the resultant effect on the
body-nicotine addiction-is intended
when the manufacturer (as we are
assuming for the purposes of this appeal)
deliberately designs the product to have
that effect. This meaning is the primary,
literal, and most common one attached to
the word "intend," and it is ordinarily the
one we should use. * * * The majority's
argument does not convince me that we
should abandon this common sense rule
in this situation.
Prior to these rules, the FDA had
"asserted jurisdiction over cigarettes only
when health claims were made by the
vendors or manufacturers." * * * No
other court, however, has been
confronted with the type and quantity of
evidence collected during the rulemaking
process in this case; the strength of
nicotine's addictive qualities, the extent of
the health problems created by tobacco
products, and the complicity of the
manufacturers bring us to a different place
than we have been before.
Products deliberately designed to
create and sustain addiction are not likely
to be marketed as such; indeed, such
products are more likely listed elsewhere
in Title 21 among the illegal controlled
substances. It strikes me as patently
absurd to contend that cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco, products that are
(under the assumed facts) actually
designed to exert powerful and
quintessentially drug-like effects on the
users, should escape FDA regulation
because the products are marketed as
essential accoutrements of a more exciting
or more sophisticated lifestyle.
II
Tobacco products, then, come
squarely within the plain terms of the
FDCA. If the words of a statute are plain,
"absent any 'indication that doing so
would frustrate Congress's clear intention
or yield patent absurdity, our obligation is
to apply the statute as Congress wrote
it.'" * * * The questions, then, should
be: Does upholding FDA jurisdiction over
tobacco frustrate clear congressional
intent to withhold such jurisdiction? Is it
patently absurd? Does it "conflict with
any other section of the Code, or with any
important state or federal interest, [or] is a
contrary view suggested by the legislative
history[?]" * * * In other words, given
the plain language used * * *, the question
should be whether the intent manifested
by the words used-that tobacco
products are "drugs delivery devices"
subject to FDA regulation-is trumped by
evidence to the contrary.
A
The majority opens with this
argument: The FDA's mandate is to
prevent the marketing of any drug or
device that is found to be unsafe; tobacco
products are unsafe; to allow the
continued sale of cigarettes is completely
at odds with such mandate; ergo, the
regulations must be struck down. But
whether the regulations contravene the
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statute is a question wholly apart from
whether any regulations could be issued.
How the FDA has chosen to regulate
tobacco has no bearing on the question of
whether that agency has the authority to
regulate it at all, particularly when it is
agreed that the power to regulate under
the FDCA includes the power (under the
assumed facts) to ban tobacco products
completely. The FDA made an eminently
reasonable decision to focus on
preventing addiction among children
while permitting sales to adults. * * * It is
no argument to say that the FDA can do
nothing because it could have done more.
B
The majority's analysis of the
"extrinsic evidence" of congressional
intent stands on three legs: The lack of
any mention of tobacco in the statute
itself or the legislative history of the 1938
Act; the FDA's consistent disavowal of
any intention of taking jurisdiction over
tobacco, and, concomitantly, the general
assumption that the agency was right; and
the series of tobacco-related statutes
enacted over the last thirty years. ***
The FDCA
In construing remedial legislation, we
must be ever mindful of the salutary
purpose of the statute[:]
The historical expansion of the
definition of drug, and the creation
of a parallel concept of devices,
clearly show, we think, that
Congress fully intended that the
Act's coverage be as broad as its
literal language indicates-and
equally clearly, broader than any
strict medical definition might
otherwise allow. [W]e are all the
more convinced that we must give
effect to congressional intent in
view of the well-accepted principle
that remedial legislation such as the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is to
be given a liberal construction
consistent with the Act's overriding
purpose to protect the public health.
The majority starts off on the wrong foot
when it asks "whether Congress intended
to delegate jurisdiction over tobacco
products to the FDA."
Congress did not "intend" that any
particular product be included; as the
district court noted, "[r]ather than itemize
each product subject to regulation under
the FDCA, Congress defined these
categories broadly so that each
encompasses a wide range of products."
* * * An exhaustive list of covered
products was neither feasible nor
necessary; effective regulation required
flexibility within broad parameters.
Pointing out the obvious-that the
FDCA was not originally directed at
tobacco-gets us nowhere. No one
contends that Congress foresaw in 1938
that tobacco was or might someday be
included as a "drug" under the FDCA.
The operative congressional intent at the
outset was simply to confer broad
discretionary powers on the FDA to
regulate "drugs" and "devices." The
FDCA was written broadly enough to
accommodate both new products and
evolving knowledge about existing ones,
and it was written that way on purpose.
FDA's Prior Position
Until the rulemaking began in 1995,
the FDA had interpreted the FDCA to
include tobacco products only when
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health claims were made. * ** The
agency's refusal even extended to
opposing citizens' petitions to regulate
cigarettes on essentially the same basis
that is used in the regulations today. ***
The agency's current position is a
response to the increasing level of
knowledge about the addictive nature of
nicotine and the manufacturer's deliberate
design to enhance and sustain the additive
effect of tobacco products. When the
early tobacco-specific statutes were being
debated in Congress, the essential link
between tobacco and illness had not yet
been proven to the satisfaction of all. For
instance, during the floor debate on
amendments to the FCLAA, Rep. Perkins
stated that
[I]t is my feeling that not one of the
tobacco farmers in my district would
knowingly produce any commodity
which, when consumed, would
cause the dread diseases which have
been claimed to be associated with
tobacco. But the claims .. . are not
proved. Tobacco has been
impeached in passion but it had not
been convicted in fact. Facts, cold
hard facts are the basis upon which
congress should legislate. ***
Well, the "cold hard facts" are now in.
"drugs," the FDA regulations are indeed
the result of turnaround in agency
thinking, and tobacco was most probably
not on anyone's mind when the FDCA
was enacted. But the FDCA was broadly
worded by design. In an area in which
complex new products (and old products,
seen in the light of new evidence) pose the
potential for grievous harm, Congress
deemed it necessary to delegate to an
expert-the FDA-the job of monitoring
drugs. Cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
clearly fit within the literal terms of the
FDCA. Absent a showing that following
these statutory terms would be absurd or
somehow frustrate congressional intent,
we are bound to uphold FDA jurisdiction.
V
I would affirm the district court's
judgment to the extent that it denies
summary judgment to the tobacco
companies on the issues of the FDA's
authority to regulate tobacco products
under the FDCA and to regulate such
products as "combination products." I
would vacate the judgment below to the
extent it grants summary judgment to the
companies on the issue of the FDA's
authority to regulate the advertising of
tobacco products.
C
Tobacco is different from the articles
commonly associated with the word
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COURT TO DECIDE F.D.A. POWER ON TOBACCO
The New York Times
Tuesday, April 27, 1999
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court offered itself
today as the next battleground in the
tobacco wars, announcing that it would
decide whether the Food and Drug
Administration has authority to regulate
tobacco products as drugs and cigarettes
as "drug delivery devices."
In accepting an appeal by the Clinton
Administration, the Court kept alive the
prospect that the extensive regulations the
Federal agency issued in 1996, aimed at
deterring smoking by minors through
restrictions on cigarette sales and
advertising, may yet take effect.
The regulations were struck down last
year by the Federal appeals court in
Richmond on the ground that Congress
had not given the Food and Drug
Administration the authority to regulate
tobacco products.
In its appeal to the Supreme Court,
the Administration said the 2-to-1 ruling
last August by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit would
"deprive the public of an unparalleled
opportunity to prevent millions of
children from acquiring a highly addictive
habit that often leads to premature death."
The appeal, filed by Solicitor General
Seth P. Waxman, said the regulations were
a result of "the most important public
health and safety rule-making that F.D.A.
has conducted in the past 50 years."
The tobacco industry, which had
brought the suit to block the regulations
as soon as they were issued, tried to
dissuade the Justices from taking the case
by arguing that the settlement reached last
fall between the industry and 46 states
already included an array of restrictions.
In addition, the industry argued, the
question of the Food and Drug
Administration's jurisdiction remained
before Congress. In his State of the Union
speech in January, President Clinton
renewed his request to Congress for
legislation "to reaffirm" the agency's
authority-authority that the appeals
court's majority found had never existed.
The case, Food and Drug
Administration v. Brown and Williamson
Tobacco Corp., No. 98-1152, is likely to
be argued in November, with a decision
some time next spring. Even if the agency
prevails, however, the case will be far
from over. The tobacco industry has
raised a variety of statutory and
constitutional objections to the
regulations, including a First Amendment
challenge to the advertising restrictions.
Having concluded that the agency lacked
authority to issue the regulations, the
appeals court did not address these
specific issues but would have to do so if
the Supreme Court disagreed with its
jurisdictional conclusion.
In the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
of 1938, Congress gave the Food and
Drug Administration jurisdiction over
drugs and "devices," both of which the
law defined as items "intended to affect
the structure or any function of the
body." For years the agency viewed this
language as not conveying authority to
regulate tobacco products.
104
But it changed its mind in the mid-
1990's after studying the issue in light of
new disclosures from tobacco industry
witnesses and documents showing that
manufacturers carefully controlled the
amount of nicotine in cigarettes and
viewed their product as a means for
delivering doses of a habit-forming
chemical. Thus, the agency concluded,
nicotine not only had obvious effects on
bodily functions but was also "intended"
by the cigarette industry to have those
effects. Judge William L. Osteen Sr. of
Federal District Court in Greensboro,
N.C., agreed, upholding the F.D.A.'s
authority in a 1997 ruling that the appeals
court then overturned.
The appellate panel's majority said
that while a "mechanical reading" of the
statute appeared to support the agency's
assertion of jurisdiction, the overall
structure of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act did not. The court said that
since the F.D.A. had concluded that
cigarettes were fundamentally unsafe, its
only option under the law was not to
regulate them but to ban them, as it would
ban any other unsafe drug-something
Congress had clearly not intended, in the
majority's view.
While acknowledging that the outlook
at the Supreme Court is uncertain,
antismoking advocates greeted the Court's
announcement today with relief. Matthew
L. Myers, executive vice president of the
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, said
the Court's decision to take the case "has
to be interpreted as an appreciation of the
public health importance of the issues
raised."
Mr. Myers, a lawyer, said the outcome
might well be determined by whether the
case strikes the Justices as "about an
agency that reached out for authority it
was never given or about an industry
seeking to be rewarded for decades of
hiding the truth."
Thirty-nine states filed a brief urging
the Justices to hear the Administration's
appeal. They said that despite last year's
multistate settlement, the Federal agency's
regulations "address matters that cannot
be effectively addressed by the states
alone."
Like the regulations, the terms of the
settlement include specific provisions
aimed at smoking by minors, but the
F.D.A. regulation had broader restrictions
on outdoor signs, other advertising and
certain retail practices, including limits on
vending machines, self-service sales, and
coupon redemptions.
The Court granted a second case
today, agreeing to decide whether a
Reconstruction-era civil rights law bars
discrimination against noncitizens in the
making of private contracts.
The lower Federal courts have been in
dispute on the question for years, and the
Justices' effort to decide it four years ago
was thwarted when the parties settled a
case the Court had agreed to decide.
The case today, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters v. Anderson, No. 98-958, is
an appeal by a labor union that dismissed
its business manager, a legal immigrant
from Jamaica, because he was not a
United States citizen.
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in Manhattan,
ruled last year that the man was entitled to
bring a discrimination suit under the
Federal law known as Section 1981, which
guarantees to "all persons" the same right
to make and enforce contracts "as is
enjoyed by white citizens." While that law,
derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
clearly applies to race, the question is
whether it also bars discrimination against
aliens.
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Nine years ago, Congress revisited the
law and strengthened its protects to
overturn a Supreme Court decision that
had narrowed it. Among other things,
Congress made clear that the law barred
private as well as state-sponsored
discrimination.
But Congress did not address the
question of the law's application to
citizenship in the first place. This case was
evidently the subject of unusual behind-
the-scenes activity among the Justices,
who considered what to do with it at eight
successive closed-door conferences before
issuing today's order.
Copyright C) 1999 The New York Times
Company
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HIGH COURT WILL HEAR NICOTINE ARGUMENTS
The Federal Government Wants Court to Decide Whether the FDA has
Jurisdiction Over Tobacco
The Raleigh News-Observer
Tuesday, April 27, 1999
James Rosen, Washington Correspondent
WASHINGTON - The Supreme
Court volunteered Monday to referee a
major dispute between the federal
government and the tobacco industry over
whether the Food and Drug
Administration has the power to regulate
nicotine as a drug. In deciding to hear the
government's appeal of a lower court's
rejection of FDA jurisdiction over
tobacco, the high court keeps alive the
centerpiece initiative of President
Clinton's drive to reduce teen smoking.
Clinton cheered the justices' decision
to take on the issue of FDA regulation of
tobacco, which anti-smoking lawmakers
tried unsuccessfully last year to mandate
through legislation.
"Every day, 3,000 young people
become regular smokers and 1,000 will
have their lives cut short as a result,"
Clinton said. "I remain firmly committed
to the FDA rule, which will help stop
young people from smoking before they
start by eliminating advertising aimed at
children and curbing minors' access to
tobacco products."
Lawyers for the government and the
cigarette makers probably will make oral
arguments before the Supreme Court by
the end of the year, with a ruling expected
in the first half of next year.
"It will be the most important public
health case the Supreme Court hears in
decades," said Dr. David Kessler, a
pediatrician and dean of the Yale
University Medical School.
Kessler formulated the FDA
regulations and persuaded Clinton to push
them when Kessler headed the agency in
the mid-1990s.
The FDA rules impose sweeping new
advertising limits on the industry and ban
most cigarette vending machines, cigarette
self-service displays and free samples.
They require tobacco vendors to verify
their customers' age with photo
identification.
Cigarette makers are also prohibited
under the regulations from putting brand
names or images on the promotional
products that are so popular with youths,
such as baseball caps, T-shirts and gym
bags. And the rules outlaw use of tobacco
brands to sponsor sporting or
entertainment events.
But the regulations have been under
attack from the tobacco industry almost
from the day Clinton announced them in
August 1996. The industry filed suit soon
after they were proposed, and lower
courts have overturned most of them.
The government says authority to
regulate tobacco is vested in the FDA
under the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.
That law, it says, enables the agency to
control nicotine as a drug and to oversee
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the production and distribution of
cigarettes as drug-delivery devices.
The tobacco industry counters that
Congress didn't intend tobacco to be one
of the products regulated by the FDA in
setting up the agency, and that it would
have to pass a separate law to give the
FDA that power. Unfettered FDA
control, the industry says, would lead to
an eventual ban on smoking.
Democratic Sen. John Edwards of
North Carolina said he was surprised by
the high court's willingness to hear the
case because he believes that the 4th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled correctly
last year in striking down FDA
jurisdiction.
"I think congressional intent in this
area is clear," Edwards said. "Congress
has never shown the slightest intent to put
tobacco under the FDA, and it's had
numerous opportunities to do so. There
have been a number of bills introduced,
and they've never gone anywhere."
Age verification with photo ID is the
only provision of the FDA rules in effect
because lower courts struck down the rest
in earlier rulings. A three-judge panel of
the 4 Circuit ruled last August that the
FDA lacks legal power to regulate
tobacco.
'We believe the 4 Circuit correctly
interpreted and applied the laws regarding
FDA authority, and we believe that
court's opinion will be upheld by the
Supreme Court," said Charles A. Blixt,
executive vice president of R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. in Winston-Salem, N.C.
Mary Carnovale, a spokeswoman for
Philip Morris Inc., said the world's largest
cigarette manufacturer already has
implemented some of the FDA
regulations as part of the industry's
settlement of states' lawsuits over the cost
of treating sick smokers.
"We have removed all billboard and
transit advertising nationwide,
discontinued tobacco brand merchandise
and apparel, and provided substantial
funding for public research and youth-
smoking prevention efforts," she said.
"Preventing kids from smoking is an
important business priority."
Matthew Myers, executive vice
president of the Campaign for Tobacco-
Free Kids, said tobacco is the only legal
product that is not subject to health and
safety regulations.
"Today's decision reflects the
Supreme Court's appreciation of the
extraordinary public health implications of
this case, separate from the legal issues,"
he said. "It will determine whether an
industry can escape federal legislation by
hiding the truth from Congress and
federal regulators for decades."
Myers and other public health
advocates say lawmakers failed to place
controls on tobacco because the cigarette
makers deceived Congress and the public
by withholding information about the
health effects of their products.
The tobacco industry agreed to accept
FDA regulation, with certain restrictions,
as part of a proposed settlement with state
attorneys general in June 1997.
That settlement package required
congressional approval because it gave the
industry liability protections against a
range of class-action and other civil
lawsuits. The bill that eventually emerged
from the package died in the Senate last
June after a month of debate, and the
tobacco firms reached a more modest
settlement with the states.
Copyright © 1999 The Raleigh News-
Observer
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JUSTICES TO DECIDE FDA'S TOBACCO AUTHORITY
The Washington Post
Tuesday, April 27, 1999
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday
to determine whether the Food and Drug
Administration has authority to regulate
tobacco products, in a case testing the
government's effort to control cigarette
makers and prevent young people from
smoking.
The FDA asserted broad authority
over tobacco in 1996 in light of evidence
that manufacturers deliberately fed
smokers' nicotine habits and targeted
young people with their advertising. But a
federal appeals court panel ruled 2 to 1
last August that the agency went too far
by imposing policy that is the domain of
Congress.
By granting the government's appeal
for a review of the case later this year, the
court is intervening in a high-stakes
dispute over the government's crusade
against tobacco at a time of escalating
legal and political attacks on the industry.
Government lawyers say the FDA
rules restricting teenagers' access to
cigarettes and preventing tobacco
companies from promoting their products
to young people offer "an unparalleled
opportunity to curb tobacco use by
children." Among the new mandates was
a national minimum age of 18 for buying
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco and a
requirement that retailers check the photo
identification of any purchaser who looks
younger than 27.
"Every day, 3,000 young people
become regular smokers and 1,000 will
have their lives cut short as a result,"
President Clinton said in a statement
applauding the court's decision to hear the
appeal. "I remain firmly committed to the
FDA rule, which will help stop young
people from smoking before they start."
But the cigarette companies, which
had urged the justices to let stand the
ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 4t' Circuit, contend that Congress has
repeatedly denied the agency authority
over tobacco products. The FDA
regulation, said the tobacco manufacturers
and distributors in their brief, "short-
circuit[ed] an ongoing political process."
"We believe the [lower court]
correctly interpreted and applied the laws
regarding FDA authority, and we believe
that court's opinion will be upheld by the
Supreme Court," said Charles A. Blixt,
general counsel for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co..
For years the federal government,
state officials and individuals have waged
war in an effort to discourage smoking,
especially among the young, and to hold
the industry financially responsible for
smoking-related illnesses. A proposed
national tobacco bill in the Senate that
would have guaranteed federal authority
over tobacco collapsed last year.
But the states and industry soon after
signed a more limited pact in which
tobacco companies agreed to pay states $
246 billion. Meanwhile, individual lawsuits
brought by smokers have led to a recent
spate of big jury awards against the
companies.
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When the FDA asserted authority
over tobacco, it brought the cigarette
industry under its purview for the first
time.
"Without the Food and Drug
Administration there is no governmental
agency with the authority to rein in the
tobacco industry's marketing to children
or to require them to reduce the harm
caused by the product," said Matthew
Myers of the National Center for
Tobacco-Free Kids.
In 1996, the agency reversed a
decades-old stance that it lacked control
over tobacco. The FDA decided tobacco
products are "drugs" and "devices" under
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, partly based on the fact that nicotine
in tobacco products "affects the structure
or any function of the body." The agency
relied heavily on newly disclosed industry
documents that showed companies long
knew of nicotine's addictive quality and
manipulated the drug in cigarettes.
The FDA said it was focusing on
children rather than adults in part because
"the sudden withdrawal from the market
of products to which so many millions of
people are addicted would be dangerous."
The new rules would ban most
cigarette vending machines and self-
service displays in stores, as well as require
retailers to verify that a purchaser is at
least 18 years old. Tobacco advertising
would be prohibited within 1,000 feet of
schools and playgrounds and limited to
black and white text. In addition, tobacco
brand names would be kept off some
sports gear. During the litigation, the only
rule in effect has been the national
minimum age and a photo ID
requirement for purchasers who look
younger than 27.
A federal district judge upheld the
FDA authority to regulate tobacco
products as drugs and devices but said the
agency lacked jurisdiction to restrict
advertising. Last year, a panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 4' Circuit
reversed the district court, saying the
agency lacked all authority over tobacco
products.
"In the 60 years following the passage
of the act [in 1938], the FDA has
repeatedly informed Congress that
cigarettes marketed without therapeutic
claims do not fit within the scope of the
act," the appeals court said in an opinion,
stressing that "neither federal agencies nor
the courts can substitute their policy
judgments for those of Congress."
The high court's decision to take
Food and Drug Administration v. Brown
and Williamson Tobacco means that at
least four justices voted to review the 4th
Circuit ruling in the term that begins next
fall. But nothing in the justices' past
writings make clear how a majority (at
least five) would decide the merits of the
case that could have broad consequences
for Big Tobacco, the FDA and all
agencies' asserting authority not explicitly
sanctioned by Congress.
Staff writers John Schwartz and Saundra
Torry contributed to this report.
Background
The FDA and Tobacco
1996: The FDA for the first time
determines that tobacco products can be
considered "drugs" and "devices" under
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and
imposes regulations aimed at reducing
teenage smoking and restricting marketing
of products. Among other rules, the FDA
establishes 18 as the national minimum
age for buying tobacco products and
orders retailers to check the photo ID of
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any purchaser who looks younger than 27.
Tobacco companies immediately file suit,
arguing that Congress never gave the
FDA such authority.
1997: U.S. district judge upholds FDA
authority to regulate cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco products as drugs and
devices but says the agency lacks
jurisdiction to restrict advertising.
1998: By a 2 to 1 vote, a panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit
reverses the district court and rules that
the FDA lacks all authority to regulate
tobacco products. The court notes that
for six decades after passage of the act,
the FDA had repeatedly said tobacco was
not within its scope. The opinion stresses
that "neither federal agencies nor the
courts can substitute their policy
judgments for those of Congress."
Yesterday: The U.S. Supreme Court
announces it will take up the FDA's
appeal of 4th Circuit ruling. Oral
arguments are to be heard in the fall.
Copyright C 1999 The Washington Post
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FDA ASKS SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW OPINION
INVALIDATING TOBACCO REGS
Tobacco Industry Litigation Reporter
Friday, January 29, 1999
The opinion by the Fourth Circuit
U.S. Court of Appeals invalidating the
FDA's tobacco regulations was based on a
"fundamentally flawed approach to the
interpretation of the Federal Fo od, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act," according to a
petition for review filed earlier this month
with the Supreme Court by the Food and
Drug Administration. Food and Drug
Administration v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., No. 98-1152 (an. 19,
1999, certiorari petition); see Tobacco
Industry LR, Nov. 13, 1998, P. 18.
The Fourth Circuit ruled last August
that the Food and Drug Administration
has no authority to regulate cigarettes as a
drug or as a drug-delivery device, and that
all tobacco regulations issued by the FDA
in August 1996 are invalid.
The FDA issued its regulations on
Aug. 28, 1996; they were intended to
restrict the sale and distribution of
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to
minors and to limit the advertising and
promotion of tobacco products.
A group of tobacco companies,
convenience store retailers and advertisers
challenged the regulations with actions
filed in the Middle District of North
Carolina, in which they challenged the
FDA's jurisdiction over tobacco products.
In a motion for summary judgment, the
challengers argued that Congress has
withheld from the FDA the jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco products and that the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
does not permit the FDA to regulate
tobacco products either as drugs or as
devices. In a 1997 opinion, U.S. District
Judge William L. Osteen Sr. ruled that
Congress did not intend to withholdjurisdiction over tobacco from the FDA,
and that the FDA had authority to
regulate tobacco products under the
provisions of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act giving the agency authority
to regulate medical devices. However, he
also determined that the FDA lacked
authority to impose restrictions on
tobacco advertising. The judge stayed
implementation of the FDA regulations
pending appeal, and he certified his ruling
for interlocutory appeal.
Tobacco companies then appealed the
ruling that the FDA has authority to
regulate nicotine and tobacco products,
and the FDA appealed the ruling that it
lacks authority to regulate tobacco
advertising.
In its Aug. 14 opinion reversing the
District Court, a two-judge majority held
that Congress did not intend for the FDA
to regulate tobacco products when it
enacted the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act. "The fact is that Congress
did not equip the FDA with tools
appropriate for the regulation of tobacco
because it had no intention that the Act
apply to tobacco products," the majority
said.
The Fourth Circuit panel based its
ruling on its analysis of the operative
provisions of the Act, which it said
"simply cannot accommodate tobacco
products," and on events surrounding the
1938 passage of the act and subsequent
statements and actions by Congress and
the FDA.
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The opinion recites a litany of
guidelines, hearings and court rulings
showing that the FDA has avoided
tobacco regulation for much of this
century. It includes statements by two
former FDA commissioners, one in 1972
and one in 1989, that the agency could not
regulate tobacco under the act. It also
notes that Congress has rejected 15 bills
that would have given it authority to
regulate tobacco.
"We believe that the actions rejected
and taken by Congress with respect to the
regulation of tobacco provide strong
evidence of congressional intent that it,
and not the FDA, controls the regulation
of tobacco products," Judge H. Emory
Widener Jr. wrote for the majority.
Senior U.S. Circuit Judge Kenneth K.
Hall dissented. He noted that recently
disclosed evidence has shown that
tobacco companies have known about the
addictive nature of their products for
years and that they have deliberately
manipulated the nicotine content of their
products to create and sustain the
addictions of smokers. With this
background, FDA regulations intended to
prevent minors from smoking "cannot
possibly be contrary" to Congress' intent
expressed in the Food, Drug & Cosmetic
Act of protecting the public health.
The Fourth Circuit denied the FDA's
rehearing petition in November.
In its 30-page petition for a writ of
certiorari, FDA says that the Fourth
Circuit ruled that it had no jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco products unless tobacco
manufacturers market their products with
specific therapeutic claims for their
products, a holding which it says is based
on a serious misreading of the act.
The Agency contends that the act
gives it authority to regulate drugs and
devices unless a product is expressly
excluded from the act's definition of
"drug" or "device"; that the act does not
exclude tobacco from either definition;
and that it applied this standard to
conclude that tobacco products fall within
the act's statutory definitions of a "drug"
and "device."
The FDA also says it based its
conclusion on "an overwhelming factual
record" showing that (1) the nicotine in
tobacco causes and sustains addiction, and
acts as a sedative, stimulant and appetite
suppressant; (2) most persons who use
tobacco products do so in order to
achieve those effects; (3) tobacco
manufacturers know that consumer use
their products for those purposes; and (4)
tobacco manufacturers design their
products to deliver pharmacologically
actives doses of nicotine.
Given this evidence, the agency
argues, it reasonably concluded that
tobacco products fall within the act's
definitions of "drug" and "device," and its
reasonable interpretation of the act was
"entitled to deference" by the Fourth
Circuit.
The agency next argues that the
Fourth Circuit's ruling that it lacked
authority to regulate tobacco was based
on three legal errors. First, it says that the
court started with the "wrong question"
when it asked whether Congress intended
to give the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco
products. Congress did not intend that
any particular product be included, it says.
Instead, it enacted general definitions of
"drug" and "device" so that the FDA
could decide whether a particular product
is subject to regulation as drug or device.
Second, FDA says that the Fourth
Circuit's decision rests on "fundamental
misconceptions" concerning when an
appeals court is required to defer an
agency's findings. Under the Supreme
Court's 1984 opinion in Chevron U.S.A.
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Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., the FDA argues, an agency's
findings are entitled to deference "as long
as an agency is reasonably interpreting a
provision it enforces."
Third, the FDA argues that in
concluding that Congress intended to
preclude FDA from regulating tobacco
products, the Fourth Circuit's decision
conflicts with the plain language of the
controlling definitions of "drug" and
"device."
"In sum, when the standard that
Congress has selected for determining
whether a product is a drug or a device is
applied to the extensive evidence before
FDA, it is clear that FDA acted
reasonably in concluding that tobacco
products are subject to regulation under
the Act as 'drugs' and 'devices.' This
Court should grant certiorari to review the
panels' contrary conclusion," FDA insists.
The FDA is represented in the action
by Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman;
Assistant Attorney General Frank W.
Hunger; Deputy Solicitor General Edwin
S. Kneedler; Assistant to the Solicitor
General Irving L. Gornstein; and DOJ
attorneys Eugene Thirolf Douglas Letter,
Gerald C. Kell and Christine N. Kohl.
FDA chief Counsel Margaret Jan Porter
and Associate Chief Counsel Karen E.
Schiefter and Patricia J. Kaeding were also
involved in the briefing.
Copyright C 1999 Andrews Publications,
Inc.
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STATES SETTLE WITH BIG TOBACCO
The Washington Post
Updated December 23, 1998
The tobacco industry in November
1998 clinched a $206 billion deal to settle
all state lawsuits pending against it,
rebounding from an unprecedented
assault to ensure its financial health and
secure significant legal protection for years
to come.
The deal, while under attack from
health groups and congressional tobacco
foes, marks a turning point in the decades-
long struggle over smoking. It ends the
most formidable legal challenge ever
launched against the powerful industry,
returning the battle largely to Congress
and state legislatures.
The settlement will pour billions into
state treasuries over the next 25 years and
provide about $1.5 billion for research
and advertising against underage tobacco
use-all of it coming from an industry
that had never paid a cent in damages
despite decades of litigation.
Another likely result is that cigarette
makers will pass the cost along to
smokers, increasing the price per pack by
about 40 cents by 2003, which could
translate into an even larger price boost
for consumers.
The settlement, agreed to by 46 states,
the District and four territories, is far
narrower than either the unsuccessful
tobacco deal proposed in 1997 or the
tobacco bill championed in 1998 by Sen.
John McCain (R-Ariz.) but killed by the
Senate's Republican leadership.
Those measures would have forced
huge price increases on cigarettes, granted
the Food and Drug Administration broad
authority over tobacco and imposed
financial penalties if smoking rates failed
to decline.
None of those provisions are included
in the deal with the states.
The earlier proposals would also have
included strong marketing and advertising
restrictions. While they would have
banished cartoon characters and human
figures forever from cigarette ads, Philip
Morris Co.'s Marlboro Man remains alive
under the deal with the states.
On the other side of the ledger, the
industry failed to get its most coveted
wish-broad protection from all
individual and class-action lawsuits. Those
legal challenges remain, including a major
class-action case in Florida. But they do
not represent as immediate and broad a
threat as the suits filed by the chief law
enforcement officers in 40 states. The
Justice Department is also continuing its
wide-ranging investigation of the industry.
Many health advocates have
pronounced the deal a disaster, at best a
pact that will bring money and some
public health advances to states, and at
worst one that will give the tobacco
industry a weapon against more
substantive anti-smoking measures.
Given the strong hand tobacco foes
held as recently as five months earlier and
the industry's defensive position at that
time, the deal seemed an anticlimax. Then,
the industry faced 40 state lawsuits and
about a dozen class-action cases financed
by some of the deepest pockets in the trial
bar. A judge had ruled in favor of strong
FDA jurisdiction over tobacco, and a
Republican-controlled Senate committee
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had blessed a bill that would have raised
cigarette prices $1.10 per pack in five
years.
But Big Tobacco fought back. The
industry spent millions of dollars
lobbying, making substantial contributions
to the Republican Party, and launching an
unprecedented $40 million advertising
campaign. In June 1998 Senate GOP
leaders killed the McCain bill-which had
a majority of votes in its favor-by setting
a parliamentary hurdle of 60 votes.
Smoking foes say the fight is far from
over, but industry sources have said they
hope the deal with the states will buy
them several years of "peace" on the
national front.
This Tobacco Special Report includes
key Post stories on five major tobacco-
related topics: Politics and Policy,
Lawsuits, Health Issues, Teen Smoking
and Industry News. Each page also
includes relevant Web links. You can also
read the latest Post opinions and
editorials.
Copyright © 1998 The Washington Post
Company
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Also This Term:
98-896 Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC) Inc.
Ruling below (4h Cir., 149 F.3d 303, 46 Envt. Rep. Cas. 2025):
Clean Water Act citizen suit against incinerator operator that violated terms of discharge
permit is now moot, because, although past violations arguably gave citizens standing to
initiate suit, only remedy currently available to them - civil penalties to U.S. Treasury - will
not redress any injury they have suffered; plaintiffs' failure to obtain relief on merits of their
claims precludes any recovery of attorneys' fees or other litigation costs, which are available
only to "prevailing party or substantially prevailing party," 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
Question presented: (1) Is citizen suit seeking civil penalties under Section 505 of Clean
Water Act constitutionally moot under Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 66 U.S.L.W.
4174 (U.S. 1998), due to lack of redressability, when plaintiffs had standing at time of
complaint and have shown continuing injury-in-fact but have not obtained injunctive reliep
(2) Is citizen suit seeking civil penalties under Section 505 of Clean Water Act
constitutionally moot under Steel Co., due to lack of redressability, when district court has
rendered judgment as to liability and issue of liability was contested? (3) Could plaintiffs not
be awarded attorneys' fees or litigation costs because case was dismissed for mootness, even
if litigation was responsible for bringing defendant into compliance with Clean Water Act?
98-896 Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care Inc.
Ruling below (7th Cir., 143 F.3d 1072):
Medicare providers' legal challenge to implementing Medicare regulations prior to their
enforcement is not barred by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which is incorporated into Medicare Act by
42 U.S.C. § 1395ii.
Question presented: Does 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), incorporated into Medicare Act by 42
U.S.C. § 1395ii, permit skilled nursing facilities participating in Medicare program to obtain
judicial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346 to challenge validity of Medicare
regulations? 
o
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98-1101 Drye v. United States
Ruling below (8th Cir., 152 F.3d 892, 67 U.S.L.W. 1126):
Taxpayer's right under state law to inherit decedent's estate is "right to property" subject to
pre-existing federal tax liens under Section 6321 of Internal Revenue Code, regardless of
taxpayer's subsequent disclaimer of estate upon decedent's death.
Question presented: Does interest of heir in estate constitute "property" or "right to
property" to which federal tax lien attaches under 26 U.S.C. § 6321 even though heir
thereafter purports retroactively to disclaim interest under state law?
98-1480 Beck v. Prupis
Ruling below (11 t Cir., 162 F.3d 1090, 67 U.S.L.W. 1380):
Plaintiff asserting civil conspiracy claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), must prove that overt act in furtherance of
conspiracy by which plaintiff was injured was "act of racketeering" as defined in 18 U.S.C. (
1961(1).
Question presented: May employee who is terminated for both blowing whistle on and
refusing to participate in pattern of predicate acts of racketeering forbidden by RICO assert
civil RICO conspiracy claim when he has been injured by overt act in furtherance of RICO
conspiracy, which overt act is not, itself, predicate act of racketeering?
98-896 Rotella v. Wood
Ruling below (5 Cir., 147 F.3d 438):
Civil actions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act accrue upon
discovery of injury alone, and not upon discovery of both injury and pattern of racketeering
activity.
Question presented: In calculating statute of limitations for civil RICO claim, does cause
of action accrue when injury alone happens, or when plaintiff has both suffered injury and
discovered that it results from pattern of RICO activity?
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